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Income-Smoothing Behavior Under Selected Stochastic Processes
Abstract
This paper attempts to provide a framework for clarifying and testing a version of the "income-smoothing"
hypothesis. This hypothesis has been variously expressed in terms of income levels, rates of change in income,
and rates of return, inter alia. In general, each version of the hypothesis is concerned with the extent to which
managers may attempt to affect the volatility of a series of reported accounting numbers (or, in the case of
rates of return, a series of relationships among accounting numbers) via selections and applications of
accounting procedures. The alleged moti- vation for this behavior is a desire to reduce the extent to which
"bad times" and-at the other extreme-"good times" are revealed by re- ported accounting numbers. It is
suggested by some that a "smoothed" series of accounting numbers, particularly income numbers, will
enhance the value of a firm. A typical statement of this argument was provided by Hepworth: "Certainly the
owners and creditors of an enterprise will feel more confident toward a corporate management which is able
to report stable earnings than if considerable fluctuation of reported earnings exists."
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 Nicholas J. Gonedes*
 Income-smoothing Behavior under Selected
 Stochastic Processes
 I
 This paper attempts to provide a framework for clarifying and testing a
 version of the "income-smoothing" hypothesis. This hypothesis has been
 variously expressed in terms of income levels, rates of change in income,
 and rates of return, inter alia.1 In general, each version of the hypothesis
 is concerned with the extent to which managers may attempt to affect the
 volatility of a series of reported accounting numbers (or, in the case of
 rates of return, a series of relationships among accounting numbers) via
 selections and applications of accounting procedures. The alleged moti-
 vation for this behavior is a desire to reduce the extent to which "bad
 times" and-at the other extreme-"good times" are revealed by re-
 ported accounting numbers. It is suggested by some that a "smoothed"
 series of accounting numbers, particularly income numbers, will enhance
 the value of a firm. A typical statement of this argument was provided by
 Hepworth: "Certainly the owners and creditors of an enterprise will feel
 more confident toward a corporate management which is able to report
 stable earnings than if considerable fluctuation of reported earnings
 exists."2
 * University of Chicago. I am indebted to Ray Ball, Philip Brown, Eugene
 Fama, Robert S. Kaplan, and, in particular, Warren Dent for their comments on
 earlier drafts of this paper.
 1. See, e.g., M. J. Gordon, B. N. Horowitz, and P. T. Meyers, "Accounting
 Measurements and Normal Growth of the Firm," in Research in Accounting
 Measurement, ed. R. K. Jaedicke (Menasha, Wis.: American Accounting Associa-
 tion, 1966), pp. 221-31.
 2. S. R. Hepworth, "Smoothing Periodic Income," Accounting Review 28
 (January 1953): 34. A similar rationale for income-smoothing actions was ad-
 vanced in M. J. Gordon, "Postulates, Principles, and Research in Accounting,"
 Accounting Review 39 (April 1964): 32-39. Direct and indirect test of versions
 of the income-smoothing hypothesis are discussed in, e.g., Gordon, Horowitz, and
 Meyers; R. M. Copeland, "Income-Smoothing," Empirical Research in Account-
 ing, Selected Studies, 1966, in Journal of Accounting Research 4 (suppl.): 101-
 16; R. M. Copeland and R. L. Licastro, "A Note on Income-Smoothing," Account-
 ing Review 43 (July 1968): 540-45; N. Dopuch and D. Drake, "The Effect of
 Alternative Accounting Rules for Nonsubsidiary Investments," Empirical Research
 in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1966, in Journal of Accounting Research 4
 (suppl.): 192-219; J. Gagnon, "Purchase versus Pooling of Interests: The Search
 for a Predictor," Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1967, in
 Journal of Accounting Research 5 (suppl.): 187-204; T. R. Archibald, "The
 Return to Straight-Line Depreciation: An Analysis of a Change in Accounting
 Method," Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1967, in Journal
 of Accounting Researchl 5 (suppl.): 229-35; B. E. Cushing, "An Empirical Study
 of Changes in Accounting Policy," Journal of Accounting Research 7 (Autumn
 1969): 196-203; P. E. Dascher and R. E. Malcolm, "A Note on Income Smooth-
 ing in the Chemical Industry," Journal of Accounting Research 8 (Autumn 1970):
 570
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 571 Income-smoothing Behavior
 One characteristic of the available studies of the income-smoothing
 hypothesis is a lack of rigorously derived explicit statements about what
 one should expect if, in fact, income smoothing is practiced.3 Such state-
 ments are particularly important for empirical tests of the smoothing
 hypothesis, since it is difficult to test for the existence of something that
 cannot even be identified when, in fact, that something does exist. Addi-
 tionally, with one exception, the available studies do not even ask
 whether income smoothing is optimal, given the stochastic process ap-
 plicable to the accounting numbers of interest and the alleged objectives
 of income-smoothing actions; the one exception is a study by Ball and
 Watts.4 Finally, the available studies pay little (if any) attention to the
 multiperiod consequences of income-smoothing actions; the importance
 of this factor will be made clear in Section III of this paper.
 Most of this paper is concerned with the optimality of income-
 smoothing actions. In particular, a few beginning steps will be taken
 toward establishing the conditions under which income-smoothing ac-
 tions are optimal (in a sense defined below). Throughout this paper, at-
 tention is restricted to the income-smoothing hypothesis expressed in
 terms of rates of return (e.g., rates of return on common equity, rates of
 return on total assets, etc.). Two classes of stochastic processes will be
 considered with respect to rates of return (before the effects, if any, of
 smoothing actions on these rates); these classes are: martingales and
 mean-reverting processes. Note that the techniques used herein are ap-
 plicable to other versions of the smoothing hypothesis. Furthermore, if
 any of the stochastic processes assumed for rates of return are applicable
 to some other version of the income-smoothing hypothesis, then, of
 course, the conclusions of this paper also hold for that other version.
 Finally, it is important to note that this paper is only concerned with the
 effects (if any) of smoothing actions on reported accounting numbers.
 It does not deal, for example, with the effects (if any) of smoothing ac-
 tions on aggregate capital market behavior.5
 Before proceeding to technical developments, it may be worthwhile
 to briefly illustrate the importance of determining whether income-
 253-59; C. E. White, "Discretionary Accounting Decisions and Income Normaliza-
 tion," Journal of Accounting Research 8 (Autumn 1970): 260-73; and R. Ball
 and R. Watts, "Some Time Series Properties of Accounting Income" (Chicago:
 University of Chicago, 1971) (to appear in the Journal of Finance).
 3. See references in n. 2 above.
 4. Ball and Watts; but, as will be indicated (see remark 5), their conclu-
 sions regarding the effects of attempted smoothing actions are not accurate, in
 general.
 5. In this regard, it is not clear that such effects (if any) could persist,
 given the observed efficiency of capital markets (in particular, the New York Stock
 Exchange). An extensive recent review of the available theory and evidence re-
 garding efficient capital markets is provided in E. F. Fama, "Efficient Capital
 Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance 25
 (May 1970): 383-417. Some implications of capital market efficiency for external
 accounting are discussed in N. J. Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and Ex-
 ternal Accounting," Accounting Review 47 (January 1972): 11-21.
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 smoothing actions are optimal. This is done in Section II. Section III
 provides a conceptual framework for dealing with the smoothing hypoth-
 esis. Section IV provides characterizations of optimal smoothing actions.
 A summary is provided in Section V; the latter section also outlines some
 areas for additional research suggested by the results presented in this
 paper.
 II
 The existence or nonexistence of income-smoothing actions can have im-
 portant implications for (1) the observed time-series properties of re-
 ported income numbers and rates of return based upon such numbers,
 and (2) the interpretations of these properties regarding the growth and
 decline of firms-two topics that have attracted considerable attention.6
 For example, one might argue that, given monopolistic conditions, one
 should expect persistence in companies' periodic growth rates. Yet, such
 a time-series pattern might also be attributable to "smoothing" actions:
 "There are many . . . monopolistic situations that could induce persis-
 tence in earnings progress, but the same result could follow from ac-
 counting practices designed at 'managing earnings.' A clear example
 exists when provisions such as pension fund reserves are varied specifi-
 cally to achieve a smooth earnings progression. A less blatant case arises
 when the profit from one effective economic transaction is taken into the
 income statement over several years."7
 On the other hand, one can also argue that some attempts to
 "smooth" accounting number series will have destabilizing effects; in this
 regard, Lintner and Glauber assert the following: "Shifts for whatever
 reason from one method of reporting certain types of transactions or
 change to another method . . . may be quite destabilizing to the pattern
 of reported earnings, as may decisions regarding so-called extraordinary
 or nonrecurring credits and charges."8
 The contradictory nature of the above citations regarding the effects
 of attempted "smoothing" actions on the time-series properties of ac-
 counting numbers simply reflects the absence of explicit statements about
 the optimality of smoothing actions relative to the alleged motivation for
 such actions. For example, if smoothing actions have destabilizing effects
 on an accounting-number series and if the motivation behind attempted
 6. See, e.g., I. M. D. Little, "Higgledy Piggledy Growth," Institute of
 Statistics, vol. 24, no. 4 (November 1962); I. M. D. Little and A. C. Rayner,
 Higgledy Piggledy Growth Again (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966); J. Lintner and
 R. Glauber, "Higgledy Piggledy Growth in America" (paper presented at the
 Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices, University of Chicago, May 1967);
 J. Lintner and R. Glauber, "Further Observations on Higgledy Piggledy Growth"
 (paper presented at the Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices, University of
 Chicago, May 1969); R. A. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return from
 Common Stocks (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969); and Ball and Watts.
 7. Brealey, p. 89.
 8. Lintner and Glauber, p. 6.
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 573 Income-smoothing Behavior
 smoothing actions is stabilization of the number series, then why should
 one expect managers to pursue the application of such smoothing actions?
 It has been suggested that smoothing behavior may also affect em-
 pirical results regarding the relationship between firm size and profit-
 ability.9 For example, it was suggested by Hall and Weiss10 that the
 effects of smoothing actions will be such that observed profitability differ-
 ences across firms of different sizes will be "understated." But this
 specific conclusion is provided without sufficient justification. It is not
 obvious that (1) the underlying stochastic processes generating account-
 ing numbers and (2) the smoothing strategies chosen by managements
 will combine to produce the alleged effects. Moreover, this conclusion
 begs the question as to whether any kind of smoothing is, in fact, optimal
 from management's perspective. That is the question to which we now
 turn.
 III
 In order to deal with the smoothing hypothesis, it seems necessary to
 distinguish between two stochastic processes: ( 1 ) the process generating
 basic accounting numbers and (2) that generating reported accounting
 numbers. Consider a firm that uses a given set of accounting procedures
 in order to generate its accounting numbers. Selection of these procedures
 may have been based upon "convenience" issues, tax regulations, indus-
 try practices, etc. Given these procedures, the resultant accounting num-
 bers will reflect the events that affected the firm's operations. These
 events include: (1) events that occur within the factor-input markets in
 which the firm is a transactor and (2) events that occur within the firm's
 output markets. Such events may be specific to a particular industry, they
 may be economy-wide events, or they may be specific to the firm's opera-
 tions." Let rt be an accounting rate of return generated at time t under
 the given accounting procedures. Then, when looking into the future,
 basic rates of return may be defined as the stochastic process {rt; t - 1,
 9. This relationship was examined by, e.g., S. S. Alexander, "The Effect
 of Size of Manufacturing Corporation on the Distribution of Rate of Return,"
 Review of Economics and Statistics 31 (August 1949): 229-35; H. 0. Stekler,
 Profitability and Size of Firm (Berkeley: Institute of Business and Economic
 Research, University of California, 1963); and Marshall Hall and L. Weiss, "Firm
 Size and Profitability," Review of Economics and Statistics 49 (August 1967):
 319-31.
 10. Hall and Weiss, p. 321.
 11. In this regard, see P. Brown and R. Ball, "Some Preliminary Findings
 on the Association between the Earnings of a Firm, Its Industry and the Economy,"
 Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1967, in Journal of Account-
 ing Researclh 6 (suppl.): 55-77; and N. J. Gonedes, "Evidence on the Informa-
 tion Content of Accounting Income Numbers" (report no. 7115, Center for
 Mathematical Studies in Business and Economics, University of Chicago, March
 1971); and idem "Properties of Accounting Numbers: Models and Tests" (work-
 ing paper no. 64-71-2, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-
 Mellon University, January 1972).
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 2, . . .} induced by the multiperiod joint-distribution function of the
 aforementioned events. For each t, this stochastic process is associated
 with a conditional distribution function for rt, say, F(Ftlrt-k; k - 1, 2,
 ... ), Vt. In the absence of smoothing actions, and given the fixed set of
 accounting procedures, the firm will be reporting realizations from these
 conditional distribution functions. That is, in this situation (and for each
 t), the firm's reported rate of return will be equal to the realized basic
 rate of return.
 Now suppose that the management of the firm-in view of the
 basic rate of return process that it faces-decides that in each period t,
 t = 1, 2, . ., N, it would like to report a rate of return that is: (1 ) "as
 high as possible" and (2) "sufficiently close" to the previous period's re-
 ported rate of return. In other words, the firm's management wants to
 report "high" rates of return, but it does not want the reported rate-of-
 return series to be "too erratic." In order to satisfy its objective, the
 firm's management might have to report a rate of return (for each t)
 that is equal to the realized basic rate of return plus a "smoothing" (or
 "adjustment") factor. More generally, in this case, the reported rate-of-
 return process is a transformed basic rate-of-return process. The trans-
 formations are defined by deliberate "smoothing" actions, or accounting
 "manipulations." Of course, for all t, the rate of return reported in period
 t will be the "previously reported" rate of return for period t + 1. Hence,
 the selection of a smoothing factor for the current period must be based
 upon the preceding period's reported rate of return, the current period's
 realized basic rate of return, and the joint-distribution function of future
 periods' basic rates-of-return.
 As before, let {rt; t- 1, 2, . , N} be the basic rate-of-return
 process; let {i t-; t - 1, 2, . . , N} be the reported rate-of-return process
 where, for each
 t, rt"- ilt + at and {at >O; t-=1, 2,, N
 is a sequence of smoothing factors selected by the firm's management.
 Until otherwise indicated, I shall assume that any selected smoothing
 strategy {at; 1 < t < NJ is such that
 N
 Zat --=O;
 t=1
 nonzero values of fl will be considered in remark 6. This assumption
 implies that the intended effect of the smoothing strategy is simply a
 redistribution of rates of return (ex ante), rather than an alteration that
 has a "permanent" effect (relative to the finite horizon 1 < t < N). For
 example, the distribution function for r't, Vt* > 1, may be based upon
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 a pattern of installment-sales-revenue recognition and a particular cost-
 amortization scheme. If these sales and the expenditures underlying the
 costs were effected in some t such that T < t*, then (with few exceptions)
 the firm will know the associated cost amortizations and revenue recog-
 nitions for some 't t > t*. If at the end of some t > 1, t < t < t*, the
 firm concludes that its realized basic rate of return for that t is "too low"
 relative to rt-{6, then it might attempt to recognize some revenue items
 prematurely (relative to t*), thus selecting aT > 0. But, ex ante, this
 action reduces the revenue recognitions for future periods. According
 to my formulation, all such adjustments to the basic rate of return must
 cumulate to zero as of t - N. So, it is important to note that any
 smoothing action in period t has implications for reported rates-of-return
 in some t > t. In general, if a firm seeks to report a "high," but not "too
 erratic," rate-of-return series over the finite horizon [1, N], then the
 selection of a smoothing action at the end of a given period must recog-
 nize the consequences of current smoothing actions vis-a-vis future
 periods' reported rates of return.
 The preceding remarks may be formalized by expressing the
 smoothing problem as follows:12
 N
 max ) (1.1)
 subject to r't At + at, (1.2)
 N
 at =O, (1.3)
 t=1
 where E is the expectation operator, and X > 0 is a parameter defining
 the "disutility" of squared deviations of FtI from ?rt_1, Vt. The succeed-
 ing analysis is essentially unaffected by changing the exponent of
 -rtO - t-? ) in (1.1) from 2 to any integer multiple of 2. Also, as will
 be indicated below (see remark 6), the constraint (1.3) is less restrictive
 than may be inferred at first sight.
 According to my formulation of the problem, the smoothing action
 for period t a, will be selected at the end of t, after observing the realiza-
 tion of rt. This selection is to be made so that rqo is "high enough" and not
 "too far from" rF-1_0 (which is also known at time P). In effect, rf,
 r k6, and ar-k, k 1, 2, . . , define the~ state of the system when at
 is to be selected, and all t > t define the remaining stages of the N-stage
 12. Here, I am using one formulation of the objective guiding income-
 smoothing behavior, namely, minimization of a function of Vrtc _ r_c]. This
 objective appears to be consistent with the alleged motivation for smoothing:
 "stabilization" of reported number series. Some statements of the income-smooth-
 ing hypothesis would call for minimization of a function of: Mtc - EE('rtc)].
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 problem (1.1)-(1.3). A solution to this problem, that is, a sequence of
 optimal smoothing actions {at*; 1 < t < NJ should satisfy the principle
 of optimality: "An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the
 initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must con-
 stitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first
 decision."'3
 With this perspective in mind, I define the following: fk(Sk) = the
 k-stage expected return associated with the optimal action ak* and the
 state vector Sk (rk+l1, rk, rk+l, . . . , rN, ak+,, ak+2, . . . , aN). Note
 that at stage k the state vector for stage k- 1 is a random vector because
 it contains the random variable rik-.
 The sequence {fk(*)} is defined for k=N, N-i, . . ., 1 and
 fo(&) 0. Here, fN( ) applies to the first stage of the problem, and
 11(0) applies to the last stage of the problem.
 At the last stage of the problem (k = 1
 f1 (S1) - max {ri + a,1 - X{rlc -r22 (2)
 a,
 r-c ri + a1.
 According to the constraint ( 1.2), the only feasible value of a1 is
 2
 a,1 - Z ak.
 k=N
 Hence, the optimal decision for k 1 is
 2
 a, - ak,
 k=N
 where ak* for N > k > 1 are known.
 For k =N, N -, ...,2, one has
 fk(Sk) = max E{rkc X(rk- rk+le) + fk-1(Sk-1) }, (3)
 ak
 where Sk1 = (rke, rk, . . ., rN, alj', ak?1*, . . ., aN*). Since, at
 stage k, rk and rk+l1 are known, (3) becomes
 fk(Sk) = max {rk0 - X(rke- rk+le) + Efk-l(Sk-1) (4)
 ak
 Using (2) and (4), one can define the sequence of optimal smoothing
 actions {?ak*, N > k > 1} associated with the stochastic process {fr}.
 And, since future rates of return are known only in terms of their distri-
 13. R. E. Bellman, Dynamic Programming (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
 versity Press, 1957), p. 83.
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 bution functions, these optimal actions will be in the form of decision
 rules. With the aid of some tedious algebraic manipulations, it can be
 shown that the solution to the problem represented by (2) and (4) is
 (assuming E(rk2) o oo, V k)
 (Ok0 (t) 7,1 ( (Oko- (k) 1
 ak* - rk + rk+l + yk(k-1) {ZE ( )}
 Y Yk Yk k ) =k r
 (5.1)
 (ko- 1ck?1
 yk(k -1) ai* i=N
 for k N, N- 1,..., 2; and for k - 1,
 2
 a,* - Z ai*, (5.2)
 where, for (5.1),
 0)k , Ok, Y7. > ?, (5.3 )
 Oko > 04, (5.4 )
 k0 -&k > (k- 1), and)k0 -& k > &)k* (5.5)
 The quantities &k?, Wk', and Yk are parameters of the decision rule
 for ake*; the values of these parameters emerge from the solution of the
 problem represented by (2) and (4). These parameters are functions of
 k. In general, ()ko - &Wk')/[yk(k - 1)] decreases as k increases; k"/7Yk
 increases and (- Ook/yk) decreases as k increases.
 The decision rules in (5.1) and (5.2) may be used (in a straight-
 forward manner) in order to demonstrate several interesting propositions
 about optimal smoothing behavior. The next section does this for some
 selected stochastic processes, {^t; N > t > 1 }.
 IV
 This section provides characterizations of optimal smoothing actions (as
 defined in [5.1] and [5.2]) for selected stochastic processes. The analysis
 that follows considers the following question for each type of stochastic
 process: as of the end of stage k N (i.e., after observing the realized
 value of rg), what is the optimal value of ak*; in particular, is the optimal
 value nonzero? It turns out that the answers to this question may be had
 via some straightforward algebraic manipulations of the decision rule in
 (5.1). With a slight adjustment (see remark 1), the analysis can be
 extended to any stage of the process (but the conclusions for k = N need
 not carry over to other stages of the process). Throughout, it is assumed
 that rN > 0; rN <? 0 is easily recognized by appropriately changing the
 sense of the inequalities that appear in the propositions.
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 Proposition A (Strict Martingale)14
 Suppose that the stochastic process for basic rates of return is of the
 form
 rt br't + Et, with b = 1, (6)
 where E(Et) O and E(Et2) < oo. Then
 aN* (rA+1 -rN),
 TN
 and, thus, sgn{aN*}- sgn{rN+l -rN}.5
 Proof
 Under the assumptions, E(N-S) = b?+lrN+l, s > 0; incorporating this
 into (5.1) fork=Nyields
 N-1
 YN {(N- 1) Z bi 1N}rN ;j
 i=i
 N-1
 rN+1 (N-i) Z b }' (7)
 and, since b = 1, one has
 aeN (rN+l -rN). (8)
 TN
 Since )N'/TN> 0, the proposition holds.
 Remark 1.-The results in (7) and (8) may be easily extended to
 ayk* for k < N and for the process in (6). Using (5.1) again, one has
 Okt a(Ok0 (Ok0 - (k f
 ak - rk+l- ~- rk + )(k -)rk
 Yk Yk Y/ - 1)
 yk(k-1)
 k?l
 (Ok' ( Ok?0- O k' \ kI
 ?hk - (rk+i-rk)-t ek (k- 1 ) } kV
 a kk \ykkk-l1)Irk-Jai*
 As indicated in the commentary under expression (5.5), (a k'/Yk) in-
 creases as k increases, and ()ko - k') /[Yk(k - 1)] decreases as k
 increases. Hence, if k is "large," the impact of a,,*, s > k, on a?k Will
 be "small" relative to the impact of (r?+l- rk).
 14. Martingale processes are discussed in J. L. Doob, Stochastic Processes
 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953); and L. Brieman, Probability (Reading,
 Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1968).
 15. The sgn (read: "signum") function is defined by sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0,
 O if x=0, -1 if x<O.
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 Proposition B (Multiplicative Linear Semimartin-
 gale)
 Let the process for basic rates of return be as in (6) but with b # 1, and
 letUN- rN- rN+l. Let b (1 + E). Then, for N> 2,
 b > 1 and UN < O imply aN* > O; (a.1)
 b > 1 and UN < E- NrN imply aN* > 0 (a.2)
 (if b> 1,E> O);
 b< 1 and UN>O imply aN* <0; (b.1)
 0 < b < 1 and uN > ErN imply aN* < O (b.2)
 (ifO < b < 1, 0 > E > -1).
 (Note that [a.2] implies [a.1] andy for E> - 1, [b.2] implies [b.1].
 Since the proofs for parts [a.1] and [b.1] differ from those for [a.2]
 and [b.2], respectively, these parts are stated separately.)
 Proofs
 Part a.-From (5.1) one gets
 (N~ ON0 I0N"D atN --r +-N Y/N Y/N
 where
 N-1
 r {N 1 Zbi -rN}, (9.1)
 i=1
 and
 N-1
 ( r N~~~~r
 4? { (rN-UN) bi} r- UN (.2 (D (r(N9.2)
 If b > 1, 1 < b < b2 < ... < bN-1 and, thus, r > 0. Since
 (N0- (ONI O
 aN - r U) N (10)
 YN YN
 and (INO > ON' (see [5.1]-[5.5]), part (a.1) of proposition B holds.
 In order to prove part (a.2), we note the following: If b > 1, that
 is, E > 0, then bi = (1 + E)t > 1 + iE, with equality holding only
 when i -0 ori =1. Thus, for N ) 2,
 N-1 N-1
 b~ ) (1 +iE) (N-i)+E (N-1)N
 i=l 2i(11
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 Incorporating (11) into the definition of r yields the result F >
 E(N/2)rN for N > 3 (and, of course, r= E(N/2)rN for N 2). In-
 corporating the lower bound on r into (10) yields
 -ON (ON EN (O
 aN* > -N N _rN- UN (12)
 YN 2 YN
 for N > 2. A sufficient condition for aN* > 0 is
 -o 0 N N
 E- rN > UN. (13)
 (ON 2
 Recall that [WNO - N)/&N] > 1. Thus, since E > 0,
 (ON0 -ON N N
 rN E - > rN E-.
 (ON 2 2
 Consequently, a sufficient condition for (13) to hold (and thus a
 sufficient condition for aN* > 0) iS
 UN < E-rN. (14)
 2
 And, of course,
 N
 N* > ? if uN E-rN.
 Part b.-To see this part, use (9.1) and (9.2) and recognize that,
 if b < 1, then 1 > b > b2 > ... bN-l andr <0. Using (10) again, one
 has aN* < Oif UN > 0.
 In order to prove part (b.2), note that, if 0 < b < 1 (i.e.,
 0>E> - 1),then, forN?2,
 N-1
 Z bi?< (N- 1)b= (N- 1)(1 + E), (15)
 where the equality in (15) holds only when N 2. Incorporating (15)
 into (9.1) yields r < ErN for N > 3 and r= ErN for N 2. Using
 the upper bound on rin (9.1 ) yields, for N > 2,
 ON 0 -WNW
 aN '- N E ErN UN. (16)
 YN )/N
 A sufficient condition for aN* < O iS
 ErN < UN
 ON
 But, since E < 0,
 fErN E< rN.
 ON
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 Hence, a sufficient condition for aN* < 0 iS UN > Erx. And, of course,
 aN* 1< O if UN - ErN.
 Remark 2.-Note from (14) that E(N/2)rN-> oo as N-> oo.
 Thus, letting Pr( ) denote probability, Pr(uN < E[N/2]rN) -> 1 as
 N-> oo. Consequently, Pr(aN* > 0)-> 1 as N-> oo for b (1 + E)
 > 1.
 Remark 3.-Expressions for ak*, k < N may be obtained by
 imitating the manipulations used for remark 1. As in the latter remark,
 akl*, k < N, for b : 1, will depend upon a,*, s > k. And, once again,
 the effect of a,*, V s > k on ak* will be a decreasing function of the
 length of the horizon (i.e., N).
 Suppose that the generating process for basic rates of return is an
 additive semimartingale:
 rt_ it-I + g + (tS(17)
 where g is a nonzero constant, E(E) - 0 and E(Zt2) < oo. (If g - 0,
 the process is a strict martingale; see proposition A.) For this generating
 process, we have for j I 1
 E(YN-j) rN+ jg. (18)
 Proposition C (Additive Linear Semimartingale)
 Let the generating process for basic rates of return be as in (17), and
 let UN = rN -rN+1. Then,
 g> 0 and UN N<g imply aN* > 0; (c. )
 g < 0 and UN N>g imply aN* < O- (c.2)
 Proof
 Using (5. 1 ) for k - N, one has:
 N-1
 -(ON 0 (N W N0- W)Nt
 aXN - rN + _ rN+1 + yEN(N-Nl
 TN YNyNN-1
 (19)
 From (18),
 N-1 NT-1l
 Z E(rN_j) - (N- 1)rN + g i
j==l j=l
 (N - 1)N
 =(N- 1)rN+g (20)
 Incorporating (20) and UN rN- rN+? into (19) and rearranging
 yields
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 * ON0 - ONg N )NU
 a-V* = .9-- ~ UN. (21)
 NYN 2 YN
 A sufficient condition for aN* > O iS
 &)O- &0Nf N
 XNg-> UN. (22)
 (ON' 2
 Recall that (NO - (N> > )N. Thus, a sufficient condition for aN* > 0
 wheng > OisUN < g(N/2). This proves part (c.1).
 A sufficient condition for aN* <0 is
 (N0- JN N
 g- < UN. (23)
 CON 2
 When g < 0, a sufficient condition for (23), and hence a sufficient con-
 dition for aN* < 0, is UN> g(N/2). This proves part (c.2).
 Remark 4.-Note that g(N/2) -oo as N -o oo. Thus, Pr[uN <
 g(N/2)]--> 1 as N -> oo, and Pr(aN* > 0) -e 1 as N-> co, if g > 0.
 When g < 0, Pr[uN > g(N/2)J- 1 as N-> oo. Hence, for g < 0,
 Pr(aN* < 0) - 1 as N--> oo.
 Proposition D (Mean-reverting Process)
 Suppose that E(r) - u, Vk, and let r4 - - -, where E(uk2) < 00.
 Then
 aN* O if UN N 1 (a)
 UN+1 (ON
 aN* < 0 if UN+1 < O < UN, (b)
 and
 aN* > 0 if UN < O < UN+1- (c)
 Proof
 Some straightforward algebra is needed to see this. Using (5.1), for
 k- N E(r) =t, and 'k + _, one has
 -CON0 (U CNf )N 0 - O0N
 ah =(N + )+ (UN+1 + P-#) + y /lYN N YN YN
 -ON0 (k(ON (24)
 aYN* - UN+ ? UN +1.
 YN YN
 Clearly, the proposition holds. (Recall that &NO > ON > 0.)
 Remark 5.-If Uk < 0 is interpreted as indicative of "bad times"
 and Uk > 0 as indicative of "good times," then (24) suggests that, if
 "bad times" are followed by "good times," then the effect of the optimal
 smoothing action will be a dampening of the magnitude of the "good
 times." If "good times" are succeeded by "bad times," the effect will
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 be a dampening of the magnitude of "bad times" (or an attempt to
 return to "good times"). This intuitive characterization seems to be
 consistent with the general, but loosely worded, statements of the smooth-
 ing hypothesis: firms will attempt to reduce the extent to which "bad
 times" and (at the other extreme) "good times" are revealed. And
 this behavior is consistent with a mean-reverting process (as described
 in proposition D) because "bad times" (UN < 0) and "good times"
 (UN> 0) are, on average, transient phenomena. But note that nonzero
 smoothing actions may be optimal for non-mean-reverting processes as
 well (see propositions A, B, and C). Hence, contrary to the assertions
 of Ball and Watts,'6 smoothing behavior is not, in general, "nonsense"
 with respect to non-mean-reverting processes; in particular, it is not
 "nonsense" for the problem formulation given in (1.1)-(1.3).
 Remark 6.-Throughout this paper, I have imposed the con-
 straint,
 1
 ak =0. (25)
 k=N
 This constraint appears to be appropriate if one is examining a horizon
 before which and after which no nonzero smoothing actions exist. If
 this is not the case, then an appropriate constraint is:
 1
 La?k = ,(26)
 k=N
 where fl is some nonzero constant. Imposing the constraint (26) rather
 than (25) would have resulted in the inclusion of the constant term,
 Q, in the total adjustment to ak* for a,*, s > k. For example, instead
 of (5.2), that is,
 2
 a,* = -Z a,-*
 i=N
 I would have had
 2
 a,* aZ E -*.
 V
 This paper considered the "income-smoothing" hypothesis (rate-of-re-
 turn version) within the context of two kinds of stochastic processes:
 martingales and mean-reverting processes. A characterization of opti-
 mal smoothing action for an N-period horizon was derived via dynamic
 programming tools. This characterization provided access to several
 propositions regarding optimal smoothing actions under each kind of
 16. Ball and Watts, p. 3.
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 stochastic process and at various stages within the N-period horizon.
 These propositions indicate what one should expect if optimal smooth-
 ing is pursued by firms' managements. Moreover, they indicate that
 nonzero smoothing is not always optimal. The paper only dealt with
 the effects (if any) of optimal smoothing actions on reported account-
 ing numbers. It did not consider the effects (if any) of smoothing ac-
 tions on aggregate capital market behavior.'7
 The conclusions of this paper were derived by postulating an op-
 timizing model for smoothing behavior. In principle, this approach may
 reduce the generality of the conclusions, but, in return, one gets specific
 theorems about the phenomena of interest. Empirically, of course, we
 only require that managers behave as if they were guided by the postu-
 lated model.
 Some topics for future research are immediately suggested by the
 framework employed and the results presented in the above discussion.
 For example, given a characterization of optimal smoothing actions,
 it is possible to generate simulated reported rates-of-return series for
 simulated basic rates-of-return series. These results should permit iden-
 tifications of the manner in which smoothing behavior (for various
 horizon lengths) may alter the statistical properties of basic rates-of-
 return series. That is, if the basic rate of return process is adequately
 characterized as, say, a strict martingale process, is it the case that
 smoothing actions will affect this process in a manner such that reported
 rates of return will appear to be adequately described by, say, a semi-
 martingale process? Observe that these kinds of simulation results
 would also yield insights on the descriptive validity of the optimization
 model postulated in (1.1)-(1.3). The available empirical evidence sug-
 gests that reported rates of return are well described by martingale
 models.'8 And, if model (1.1)-(1.3) has any descriptive validity, one
 should observe that, for some basic rate-of-return processes, the reported
 rate-of-return processes generated via (1.1)-(1.3) are adequately de-
 scribed by martingale models. In other words, if model (1.1)-(1.3)
 has descriptive validity, the time-series properties of simulated reported
 rates of return generated by this model, for some simulated basic rate-
 of-return processes, should be consistent with the time-series properties
 of actual reported rates of return.
 Finally, given the kinds of simulation results described above and
 given empirical proxies for basic rates-of-return series, it may be pos-
 sible to conduct more refined empirical tests of the existence of in-
 come-smoothing behavior. This assertation is based on the seemingly
 reasonable assumption that it is futile to test for the existence of some-
 thing which cannot even be (directly or indirectly) identified when, in
 fact, that something does exist.
 17. But see n. S above.
 18. See, e.g., Ball and Watts.
This content downloaded from 130.91.118.71 on Thu, 26 May 2016 20:13:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
